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In what must be a virtually unsurpassed record of forbearance, Professors
Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell polished and perfected the huge
manuscript that was to become Jurisprudence for a Free Society for several
decades after it was ready for publication in virtually its present form. Such
perfectionism exhibited and confirmed a deep commitment by the authors to
the most precise possible formulation of their jurisprudential position. It also
represented great confidence that their influence would be exerted in a literal
and comprehensive fashion, that readers would be guided quite specifically in
their thinking about law through a study of this text. Only time will tell
whether this preoccupation with precision that delayed publication more than
thirty years was warranted.
McDougal and Lasswell locate their endeavor in an evolutionary process
of thinking about law, repudiating naturalism because of its supraempirical
claims of validation, and positivism because of its formalistic reliance on
logical derivations of legal decisions from abstract doctrines.' They perceive
American legal realism as an antecedent to their work, admirable for its critical
focus on the interplay between rules and social process in the enunciation of
law in authoritative form, especially through the operations of appellate
courts. 2 Indeed, the McDougal and Lasswell undertaking can be regarded as
converting the core insight of legal realism into a comprehensive framework
of inquiry, including the provision of a normative rudder-the eight constituent
values of a free society dedicated to the promotion of human dignity-by
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1. See I HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYREs S. McDOUGAL. JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SocIErY
212-17, 220-23, 231-35, 236-42 (1992) [hereinafter JURISPRUDENCE].
2. 1 id. at 249-67.
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which to assess the relative merits of opposing lines of argument and analyses
of factual circumstances.
McDougal and Lasswell thus offer a jurisprudence that breaks radically
from the positivism of John Austin and Hans Kelsen, viewing law not as the
command of the sovereign4 or-in the more contemporary formulation of
H.L.A. Hart-as the product of some rational "rule of recognition, 5 but rather
as the end result of an authoritative decision-making process.' For scholars
and policymakers, McDougal and Lasswell's configurative jurisprudence offers
the promise of a rigorous approach to decision, as well as one embedded in
social context. By following the steps set forth, McDougal and Lasswell argue
that a scientifically grounded answer to any given policy problem may be
reached that is likely to promote the common interest in achieving a world
order founded on fundamental principles of human dignity.'
As part of this endeavor, McDougal and Lasswell emphasize the
distinction between "the observational standpoints of the scholar and decision
maker," with respect to "enlightenment, as well as ... decision." The stress
on this distinction is explained primarily by a presumed difference in
orientation. The scholar is thought to be preoccupied with aggregating the
knowledge relevant to reaching the most informed decision, while the decision
maker is conditioned by the dimension of power. As McDougal and Lasswell
put it, the decision maker-unlike the scholar-is constrained by "the making
of effective choices in conformity with demanded public order."9 Without
such a distinction, it becomes impossible for the scholar to do that part of her
job that involves "appraising the rationality" of legal events "in terms of
community interest of either claims or decision."'
The other side of this search for a better jurisprudence is to ground it in
policy science properly conceived: in essence, empirical knowledge analyzed
by reference to purposive outcome. McDougal and Lasswell express their
outlook as follows: "Science is sometimes said to be 'value free'; and yet the
most obvious fact about policy is that it is value oriented, since policy is only
intelligible when it is seen as a deliberate search for the maximization of
valued goals.""
3. This framework is the work of the entire two volumes, but its nature is usefully summarized at
several points. See, e.g., I id. at xxi-xxvii; 2 id at 725-58.
4. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED I 1 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson
1954) (1832); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 30-31 (Anders Wedberg trans., Legal
Classics Library 1990) (1945).
5. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97 (1961).
6. 1 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 24-25.
7. 1 id. at 34-36.
8. 1 id. at 17, 18-24.
9. l id. at 18.
10. Id
11. 1id. at 16.
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Another take on the McDougal and Lasswell enterprise is that its aims are
primarily pedagogical rather than policy-oriented. Their preoccupation with
legal education is expressed by both their dedication "To Our Students," and
their first published effort Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, reprinted as an Appendix to their
jurisprudence. 2 There is no question that the approach they advocate is more
contextual, interdisciplinary, processive, systematic, and visionary than the
standard emphases on legal reasoning and fact/law analysis characteristic of the
way law mainly was (and is) being taught in American law schools. In some
sense, McDougal and Lasswell conceive of legal education less in terms of
vocational training and more as a means of producing enlightened citizens
capable of understanding the issues of the day as a struggle to realize the
values of human dignity. Thus, they seek through their jurisprudence a
dynamic of political engagement needed to achieve and sustain a free society.
Despite the huge delay in publication, this mammoth work remains
"unfinished." Harold Lasswell, who died in 1978, had evidently planned to
expand and document substantially the chapters for which he took primary
responsibility. 3 These constitute the bulk of the second volume. And more
surprisingly, despite a long prepublication process that included numerous
reconsiderations of how to formulate this or that dimension of the overall
orientation, the work as published has a dated quality arising partly from the
authors' failure to refer in the text or footnotes to the major scholarly work or
historical developments of the last twenty-five years. It poses a question for
reader and reviewer. Why was this mystifying preoccupation with exactitude,
which was responsible for the long deferral of publication, coupled with an
unwillingness to look up from the manuscript to take account of what others
were writing during these years and of what was going on in the world?
My own explanation would be that the core of this remarkable
jurisprudential enterprise was conceptual, pedagogical, professional, and
scientific, with reference being made to other scholarly work either for
polemical purposes (to orient critical arguments) 14 or as a matter of academic
decorum (to exhibit a reassuring and professionally proper awareness of other,
related work).' 5 The documentation, aside from cross-referencing other work
12. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YAL LJ. 203 (1943). reprinted in 2 JURWSPRuDe4CB. supra note 1. at
1265.
13. See 1 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1. at xxiii.
14. This comment applies generally to the reliance on academic sources throughout this work. and
indeed in most of the vast corpus of McDougal's scholarly output. McDougal and Lasswell use some
antecedent writing critically to situate their own enterprise, see I id. at 3-9 nn.l-17. but in the remainder
of the text other scholarly work plays virtually no role in the exposition of their theory and its application.
15. For an example of their reference to an assortment of scholarly work without any serious treatment
of the positions taken, see 1 id. at 177-81. In many footnotes, diverse, even antagonistic, works by a range
of authors are simply listed. See, e.g., 1 id. at 181 nn.49-52.
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proceeding from a kindred, and generally collaborative, viewpoint," adds
very little to the essentials of the approach. Updating would have added, at
most, little more than an aura of contemporaneity. Similarly with the evolving
global setting. Aside from the crucial, and historically (and ethically)
appropriate, distinction between democratic and totalitarian public order
systems, 7 the authors were not really concerned about depicting empirical
levels of reality at a given historical juncture.
Theirs was a remarkable collaboration, noteworthy for its coherence of
vision and pedagogical impact. But I shall argue that the jurisprudence is
conceptually troubled, and unlikely to survive once the charismatic spell cast
by its progenitors has passed.
I. COLLABORATIVE SCHOLARSHIP
It is highly unusual to find distinguished scholars with independent
reputations collaborating on works of conceptual magnitude.' 8 It is unique to
find a work of this sort prefaced by short essays by each author on his sense
of his partner in collaboration, a self-consciousness that acknowledges just how
special this jointness of endeavor really is. Lasswell begins his essay, entitled
"Lasswell on Collaboration with McDougal," with a characteristically engaging
remark: "Professor McDougal and I have been able to work together for over
thirty years in what must establish a record of sorts for an interdisciplinary
team whose members are not shackled together by the love, hate, and duty
bonds of matrimony."' 9 My own experience with collaborative scholarship
has been somewhat opposite, creating some of the bonds, for better and worse,
of a mini-marriage. But Lasswell is all business: 'The essential point in our
collaboration is common purpose and shared expectation about what is to be
16. See, e.g., 2 id. at 725-45 nn.I-10.
17. This distinction is powerfully developed and relied upon in Myres S. McDougal & Harold D.
Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1959), reprinted in MYRES S. McDOUGAL Er AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3 (1960) [hereinafter
McDOUGAL ET AL, STUDIES].
18. The only important exception in international legal studies is the treatise on international law of
Lassa Oppenheim and Hersch Lauterpacht, but even here the collaboration was less a joint scholarly
undertaking than Lauterpacht taking over the work of editing later editions of Oppenheim's original treatise.
See LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); see also
W. Michael Reisman, Lassa Oppenhein's Nine Lives, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 255, 268-70 (1994) (describing
evolution of treatise). Although prodigious, the effort was essentially doctrinal and informational, given that
the treatise's positivist jurisprudential frame was taken as fixed. For another major collaboration, see
MORTON A. KAPLAN & NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1961).
19. 1 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at xxxv. He concludes his comments in the same vein:
In some collaboration the partners keep together by multiplying side-activities. They cultivate
big game fishing, yachting, karate, or opera. McDougal and I have been so absorbed in the
central tasks the re-enforcements have been superfluous. Our collaboration has required no care
and feeding after hours. How long will our collaboration last? As long as we do.
I id. at xxxvii. And so it did! But, perhaps, a little more care and feeding would have made the process
even more satisfying, or at least so it seems to me.
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done.... The aim is to show how a comprehensive approach to the role of
knowledge in society generates a jurisprudence that furthers self-appraisal and
innovation in systems of public and civic order."2
Lasswell also tells us about the interplay of the collaborators' interests and
orientations, including his preference for working papers in contrast to
McDougal's inclination to rely on exhaustive outlines and critiques of
preliminary drafts as a way of producing by stages a manuscript. Lasswell also
takes note of McDougal's "furious tenacity" and his deployment of an
"intellectual bulldozer" to remove from the path of inquiry "traditional modes
of thought.",2' And Lasswell celebrates difference, perhaps most tellingly in
terms of intellectual style: "McDougal loves verbal combat, especially in the
frame of a prescriptive system and an appellate court. So far as I am
concerned, most combat is boring and time-wasting. My preference is for
inquiry into factual causes and consequences." '
Lasswell's inquiring mind was always pushing back the frontiers of
knowledge in relation to the social sciences. He recognized early in his career
the implications for knowledge of psychoanalysis and psychological self-
scrutiny,' of modem communications and the manipulation of information
as a dimension of power,24 and of the relevance of polling and sampling
techniques to politics in large, contemporary democracies.' Such social
science perspectives, when filtered through McDougal's more focused
preoccupation with law (conceived as the processes of authoritative decision
making), give credence to McDougal and Lasswell's joint claim to provide a
comprehensive framework for inquiry into the interface between law and
policy.
McDougal's assessment of Lasswell is more sober, and extravagantly
celebratory. McDougal praises Lasswell's achievement as the founder of what
"is now widely known, as 'the policy sciences,"'" and his specification in
empirical terms of the values decision makers should rely upon to identify
preferred policies in all arenas in which they must act authoritatively. By
20. 1 id. at xxxv.
21. 1 id at xxxvi.
22. Id
23. See the path-breaking books HAROLD D. LASSWEa. POWER AND PERSO.NALrIY (1948); HAROLD
D. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND PoLmTcs (1930); see also HAROLD D. L ss-ELL. WORLD
POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935).
24. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE IN THE WORLD WAR (1927); Harold D.
Lasswell, The World Revolution of Our Tune, in WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ELUTES 29 (Harold D. Lasswell
& Daniel Lemer eds., 1965) [hereinafter Lasswell, World Revolution).
25. Lasswell first developed this line of thought in his early writings. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL. THE
ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 224-34 (1948). He argued that survey
research was essential to understanding governmental operations and encouraging the development of
democratic and responsible governments. He was also aware, however, of the danger posed by the
development of "communications professionals." See HAROLD D. LASSWELL. ON POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY
267-78 (1977).
26. 1 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note I, at xxx.
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focusing on these values, decision makers are able to promote and develop in
practice a "jurisprudence for a free society" (that is, a framework expressing
an underlying commitment to "the basic values of human dignity").27
McDougal also emphasizes Lasswell's insistence on applying a
multidisciplinary array of perspectives, thereby aggregating knowledge being
accumulated by specialists in all fields that appear constitutive of the
behavioral domains subject to legal constraint and guidance.28
This stress on the collaborative nexus seems warranted, reflecting its
comparative rarity as well as the importance attached to its exposition by
McDougal and Lasswell in their quite revealing cross-portraits of one another.
It also bears on a paradoxical aspect of the resultant jurisprudence, and its
distinctive web of influence. On one side is the penchant for Lasswellian
taxonomies, long lists of complex items to be included in the comprehensive
mapping of what a policy adviser or policymaker should consider and do.
29
On the other is the intensely personal McDougalian approach, with the
sensitivity of a local politician to the way the world works.30
In one crucial respect, the McDougal and Lasswell orientation is richer and
more challenging than what appears in published form. Lasswell was very
much an amateur, yet highly skilled, psychoanalyst, alert above all to what was
concealed from conventional understanding in unconscious motivations and
instinctual drives; McDougal learned from this, and built upon his own past in
a rural northern Mississippi county where his father, a country doctor,
allegedly could routinely deliver 50,000 votes on election day. It was
McDougal's love of people and of helping his students gain access to power
and vocational success that brought him the greatest visible satisfaction, and
exhibited his "other" sense that power was mainly about human relations,
wheeling and dealing, the reciprocal sense of getting things done for others and
thereby engendering feelings, of gratitude and loyalty.
11. CASTING THE SPELL: PROPAGATING THE IDEAS OF THE
NEw HAVEN SCHOOL
Conjectures about the wider web of influence and impact may seem
remote from a Book Review, but arguably not in relation to the McDougal and
27. See 2 id. at 737-41.
28. McDougal writes in his prefatory note on Lasswell:
A distinctive emphasis in Lasswell's orientation to problem-solving is grounded in the wisdom
that every discipline can provide methods and insights which may be of use to those who can
use and/or understand them. Hence, his injunction to become multidisciplinary, and no one
heeded this advice better than Lasswell himself.
1 id. at xxxii.
29. See, e.g., 2 1id at 741-58 (providing clarification of values); 2 id. at 960-72 (offering
recommended approach to study of judicial decisions).
30. McDougal does not express this highly emotional, personalized style in his written work, but it
is a staple of his vivid oral performances and of his working style.
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Lasswell jurisprudence. Their jurisprudence, its potency and its limitations,
owe as much to personal style as to intellectual attributes. McDougal and
Lasswell's jurisprudential publication-produced over a period of
decades-was paralleled by a pedagogical process that sent forth influential
students from the Yale Law School to all comers of the country and the world
forever imprinted with the law, science, and policy approach.
Indeed, the McDougal and Lasswell framework has had more influence in
Third World countries than any other American jurisprudential perspective-a
surprising result given the founders' penchant for applying their theory in
justification of U.S. foreign policy.3' This truth illustrates the power of the
framework to structure decisions whatever the observational stance of the user.
It is also a tribute to McDougal's extraordinary missionary gift as an engaged
teacher. The scholars and practitioners influenced by the approach invariably
are former students. I remember being dazzled as a student by Mac's
seemingly limitless patience with foreign graduate students whose English
intonation made their speech incomprehensible to me. Somehow, Mac listened
carefully enough to create bonds that endured over great distances and for
decades, giving individuals who were then anonymous students that experience
of dignity in concrete personal encounter that the jurisprudence promised at the
level of social and political intercourse.32
What is more, unless one was actually in residence as a student or visiting
scholar, the spell was not cast. The weight of impact depended on the
existential experience of teacher, text, and pupil in the Yale Law School
milieu. My view is that A Jurisprudence for a Free Society will not be widely
read or relied upon, except by those who were directly exposed to the
pedagogic spell cast by McDougal and Lasswell's special variant of
enchantment. Why? The text on its own is too idiosyncratic and demanding to
engage general readers, and requires excessive effort to achieve the practical
purpose of promoting a useful and ethically attractive approach to the place of
law in the policy process.
Can the disciples sustain the vision of the founders? It remains to be seen,
but I doubt it. There is to be sure an Institute for the Policy Sciences based in
New Haven, which brings the faithful together annually at their own expense
for several days of stimulating discussion within the ambit of the McDougal
and Lasswell jurisprudence, and is administratively directed by a gifted
31. Perhaps the most impressive scholarly assessment of McDougal and Lasswcll's contribution by
a Third World author is that of B.S. Chimni in a long discussion that mixes appreciation and criticism. B.S.
CHIMNM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF CONTE.MPORARY APPROAcIES 73-145
(1993). Chimni's book is one of the few that tries to assess the utility of alternative approaches for the
study of international law and world order.
32. 1 omit reference to Lasswell here because he did not share this side of the teaching impact. to the
best of my understanding.
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interpreter, Andrew Willard, a scholar of independent importance.33 As well,
the Yale law faculty includes McDougal's semi-anointed successor, Michael
Reisman, himself a remarkably dedicated, wide-ranging, and talented adherent,
whose own scholarly achievement has achieved worldwide recognition and
whose teaching commitment has built a loyal following.' Whether Willard
and Reisman can do for the words of McDougal and Lasswell what Peter and
Paul did for the message of Jesus is, of course, a tall order, and not one that
appears to be their single-minded scholarly purpose.
Yet all is not lost even if the primary line of influence cannot perpetuate
itself beyond the successor generation. The jurisprudence's astonishing range
of scholarly applications is likely to provide the most resounding vindication
of the heroic efforts made by McDougal and Lasswell throughout their long,
productive careers.35 On this secondary level of influence, writers on almost
any topic of significance in international law can benefit from and are likely
to keep consulting the McDougal treatment of broad subject-matter sectors.
Scholars will find reference to the configurative approach useful both because
it provides a rich appreciation of the nature of international law in relation to
any substantive concern, and because a comprehensive exploration of the
multi-dimensionality of contested behavior in light of expectations about the
application of legal authority is likely to be useful in evaluating alternatives.
Even here there are problems. The massiveness of the tomes on specific topics
makes their revision a daunting task, and yet unless the unfolding world and
its law enterprise is incorporated, the scholarly work, despite its theoretical
merits, will soon appear superseded by time. Here, I think a conscious effort
to stimulate, and if necessary subsidize, the processes of revision would be
both intrinsically rewarding and the most promising way to keep the McDougal
and Lasswell jurisprudential torch burning in the decades ahead.
What I have written in the prior paragraph could be read as implying that
the configurative jurisprudence is superfluous, or worse, a kind of gigantic
failure. Not at all. The jurisprudence is the culmination and keystone of many
33. See INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS (V. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988); Andrew
R. Willard, Incidents: An Essay in Method, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS, supra, at 25; see also W.
Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard, The World Community, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 807 (1988).
34. Professor Reisman has been a prolific scholar, exerting influence on a wide range of topics
relevant to international law. In addition to the work cited in the previous note, and to his collaborative
work with McDougal, among Reisman's most significant contributions are W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY
AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS (1971)
and W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION (1992). In many respects,
since Lasswell's death Reisman has been McDougal's most significant collaborator, especially on matters
relating to the constitutive process of governance in international political life. The most important of this
writing is collected in MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS
(1981).
35. See 1 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at xxiv-xxvi nn. 1-5 (listing of principal works); see also
Frederick S. Tipson, Bibliography of Works by and Relating to Myres S. McDougal, in TOWARD WORLD
ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. MCDOUGAL 579 (W. Michael Reisman &
Bums H. Weston eds., 1976) [hereinafter TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY].
iV01. 104: 19911998
Casting the Spell
disparate scholarly extensions and applications. Without it there would be
something missing of a fundamental character, a cohering overall framework
for analysis and prescription. Again, my conclusion is paradoxical. The
jurisprudence is an extraordinary part of the overall achievement, yet it will not
work by itself without the living presence of its two larger-than-life architects
and charismatic disseminators.
IIl. A CRITIQUE OF THE JURISPRUDENCE 36
The great contribution of the McDougal and Lasswell jurisprudence is that
it provides an orientation toward law in any context, a coherent way of
thinking that is more systematic than alternatives, an approach that if followed,
or even approximated, assures a comprehensive and intellectually responsible
treatment of any complex problem or issue area. The impressive corpus of
scholarship by McDougal and his many collaborators on specific topics
confirms this claim, as well as its cautionary corollary: Don't expect to
overcome discretion, bias, or interpretative perspective by adopting this (or any
other) approach.37 In fairness, McDougal and Lasswell acknowledge this
limitation on their approach, at least in the abstract. They claim only that one
must be as self-conscious as possible about one's observational perspective,
and as systematic and complete in assessing policy choices as the current state
of available knowledge allows.3 On the matter of observational clarity,
greater concreteness would have made their position both more insightful about
the deformations of knowledge produced by the biases of power elites and
more persuasive, by taking into account differences of gender, race, class,
sexual orientation, and culture. There is in this vast work no discussion of
feminist, gay and lesbian, indigenous peoples', or black "readings" of
international law. This is a serious omission given the powerful critiques of
hegemonic discourses of various sorts that emerged in the 1980's and 1990's.
39
36. Prior assessments of McDougal and Lasswcll's jurspndence include CIImNI. supra note 31. at
73-145; JULIUS STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER 20-32 (1984); Oran R. Young. International Law and
Social Science: The Contributions of Myres S. McDougal, 66 AN!. J. INr"L L 60 (1972). Gerald
Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or, Woe to the Negotiators!: Your Treaty or Our "Interpretation- of It. 65 A.M.
J. INT'L L. 358 (1971) (reviewing MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL. TIlE INTERPREATION OF AGREE.MN-tEs
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967)). For my own earlier responses to McDougal and Lasswell. see
RICHARD A. FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 80-96 (1%8); Richard A. Falk. Book Review.
10 AM. J. COMP. L. 297 (1961).
37. What can be expected from a scholar or decision maker is to clarify her or his -observational
framework." See I JURISPRUDENCE supra note 1. at 17-19. It is a matter of acknowledgment of
perspective, not its transcendence, although an appropriate "'scienufic" view of knowledge reduces to a
minimum such distorting impacts. Impressively, McDougal and Lasswell assert the relevance of
psychoanalysis to probe the domain of unconscious bias and manipulation. See 2 id. at 911-41.
38. See I id. at 23.
39. See, e.g., SPIKE PETERSON & ANNE S. RUNYAN. GLOBAL GENDER ISSUES (1993): J. ANN TICKNER.
GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1992); Howard R. Berman. Perspectives on American Indian
Sovereignty and International Law, 1600 to 1776. in EXIL.ED IN TIlE LAND OF TIlE FREE 12.5-88 (Oren
Lyons et al. eds., 1992); Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law. 85 A.%t. J
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Moreover, it is not clear exactly what McDougal and Lasswell claim for
their jurisprudential stance, whether the essential claim is one of sensitizing
scholars and decision makers to the performance of their roles in a more
efficient manner, or something more. This second, stronger claim would be
that the jurisprudence could effect a series of outcomes or decisions that were
more persuasively aligned with the realization of the values of human dignity
than outcomes and decisions made impressionistically or on the basis of rival
jurisprudential stances. 40 The weak goal of sensitizing students and
policymakers seems attainable, provided the effort entailed is not so
overwhelmingly complex as to render the process impracticable. It is not
surprising that the larger goal, the adoption of the jurisprudential orientation
as method as well as perspective, has been limited to the scholarly community
(although arguably decision makers exposed to the approach might in practice
apply law more responsively to the value demands at stake). Even among
scholars, as noted earlier, the orbit of influence has been restricted to those
who have directly assimilated the approach through a period of dedicated study
within the charismatic pedagogical reach of McDougal.
The strength of the McDougal and Lasswell framework as a guide to
thought therefore needs to be separated from the more problematic claim that
with such a supposedly scientific purchase on knowledge it will be possible to
march in time while advancing toward the posited goal of "a free society"
embodying ever more fully the values of human dignity. The jurisprudence as
set forth by McDougal and Lasswell is explicitly designed to help academic
advisers and policymakers use law as a specialized instrument in a wide
variety of social and political arenas for pursuing these normative goals.4 In
my view, this part of the enterprise fails, and is doomed to failure by its
inherent nature. This failure is expressed by the inability of honest, intelligent,
morally sensitive, and politically moderate individuals steeped in the New
Haven approach to agree in the domain of policy application. Reliance on the
McDougal and Lasswell orientation tends, if anything, to accentuate policy
divergences as opposed viewpoints each claim "scientific" grounding for their
INTrL L. 613 (1991); Lurence R. Heifer, Lesbian and Gay Rights as Human Rights, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 157
(1991); Henry J. Richardson III, The Gulf Crisis and African-American Interests Under International Law.
87 AM. J. INTIL L. 42 (1993); see also HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES chs. 8-14
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992).
40. It is integral to McDougal and Lasswell's project to promote a world order based on the values
of human dignity and to avoid the challenges associated with either totalitarianism or with what they label
"a Garrison-Prison World." See 2 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 986-87. They express these wider
ambitions most forcefully in Chapter 4. See 2 id. at 973-79. McDougal and Lasswell also express a
conviction that a policymaker with authority can facilitate these ends by improving the intellectual
foundations of the decision-making process along the lines they propose. See, e.g., 2 id. at 1131-33.
41. See, e.g., 1 id. at 203-326 (analyzing functions of legal policymakers); 1 id. at 1131-1262
(clarifying intellectual tasks to be performed by legal academics and policymakers).
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positions.42 As the Chinese proverb goes, 'Two persons in the same bed have
different dreams."
Indeed, in other writing and speaking-especially that of
McDougal--devoted to discussion of controversial policy issues (how to
interpret the U.N. Charter in light of Soviet obstructionism; how to appraise
the legality of hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific; how to evaluate contested
Cold War interventions in Vietnam or Nicaragua), the results, although
elaborated in alleged relation to the jurisprudential frame, had an
uncomfortable tendency to coincide with the outlook of the U.S. government
and to seem more polemically driven than scientifically demonstrated.43
Finding myself over the years in the odd position of adhering generally to
the McDougal jurisprudential outlook, yet consistently in sharp disagreement
on policy applications," I tried on several occasions to convince my erstwhile
mentor that he misunderstood, and hence misapplied, his own theory. Of
course, such a tack involved hubris on my part, but Mac, with his exemplary
loyalty to former students and his unfailing offstage humor, seemed, or at least
so I imagined (perhaps vainly), almost to accept this effort to deny any claims
of policy "truth" deriving from his framework of inquiry. In any event,
whatever McDougal did or didn't believe, the effort to resolve policy
controversy by scientific inquiry has not succeeded. Opposing lines of
interpretation by individuals of comparable intelligence and virtue can reach
utterly opposed policy conclusions on controversial matters even as they
acknowledge their indebtedness to the McDougal and Lasswell
jurisprudence.45
42. Consider, for example, the debates on the Vietnam War by two "followers. - John Norton Moore
and myself, which appeared initially in the pages of The Yale Law Journal. See discussion and sources
cited infra note 44.
43. Some of the most important early work along these lines was collected in McDoUGAL ET AL..
STUDIES, supra note 17.
44. These disagreements often surfaced in oral encounters at professional occasions or in private
conversation, and reached their peak of intensity during the decade of debate about the legality of U.S.
participation in the Vietnam War. McDougal's views were never, as far as I know, developed
systematically, although he generally affirmed the position supporting U.S. government claims developed
by his student, John Norton Moore. See Myres S. MeDougal, Foreword to JOHN Noirro.s MooRE., LAw
AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR at vii, xi (1972); see also Myres S. MeDougal. Fornvard to ROGER H. HULL
& JOHN C. NOVOGROD, LAW AND VIETNAM at vii-ix (1968). My own orientation was highly crtieal of
U.S. official claims. See, e.g., I THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 397-400 (Richard Falk ed.,
1968).
The main issues in controversy between Professor Moore and myself were debated in a series of
articles published in the pages of The Yale Law Journal. See Richard A. Falk. International Law and the
United States Role in the Vet Nam War, 75 YALE LJ. 1122 (1966); John Norton Moore, lnternatonal Law
and the United States Role in Viet Nam: A Reply, 76 YALE LJ. 1051 (1967); Richard A. Falk. International
Law and the United States Role in Wet Nam: A Response to Professor Moore, 76 YALE Li. 1095 (1967).
Another example of sharp policy disagreement concerned the U.S. Government's insistence on testing
nuclear weapons on the high seas and in the atmosphere. See Myres S. MeDougal & Norbert A. Schle,
The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955). reprinted in McDoUGAL E" AL.
STUDIES, supra note 17, at 770-72.
45. For instance, the published work of two prominent McDougal protdgds. Michael Reisman and
Bums Weston, diverges on many crucial issues of policy controversy. Compare W. Michael Reisman,
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The jurisprudential enterprise embodies an Enlightenment confidence that
science produces over time a stream of advances in knowledge, and the further
conviction that if knowledge is properly put to the task of the realization of
values, the results will lead inevitably to human betterment.46 This
unconditional confidence in the normative benefits of knowledge does give the
McDougal and Lasswell jurisprudence a slightly old-fashioned tone. In this
heady "postmodern" era there is widespread skepticism abroad about the
generalizability of knowledge relevant to social issues, and a far greater degree
of deference to a range of different readings. To posit a comprehensive
framework of the McDougal and Lasswell variety is to suppress difference,
and to suppose that rational value categories can achieve objective knowledge.
True, McDougal and Lasswell recommend self-scrutiny in relation to
observational standpoint, but they do so to minimize the intrusion of bias,
whereas the postmodern position is that there is no way to transcend the
particularities of perspective, and hence, what is called "bias."
In cultural terms, the McDougal and Lasswell effort is thus situated in the
modernist attempt to retain human access to unconditional truth by supplanting
religion with science, in this instance social science. 7 Of course, McDougal
and Lasswell (and their many followers) invoke science for the sake of
"values," as derived from the experience of constitutional democracies in the
non-socialist West.48 To some extent, McDougal and Lasswell anticipate the
end-of-history line taken by Francis Fukuyama through their insistence that
there is one and only one general path that has the capacity to achieve a free
society.49
McDougal and Lasswell had an early and historically prophetic grasp on
the fundamental ideological struggle of the last half-century, and they resolved
Deterrence and International Law, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 339 (1983) (arguing that both
expectations of politically relevant actors and control intention--evidenced by proliferation of nuclear
weapons in decentralized system-indicate effective legality of nuclear armaments) with Burns H. Weston,
Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Prolegomenon to General Illegality, 4 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 227 (1983) (arguing that nuclear weapons are incompatible with fundamental precepts of
international law); see also TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 35 (illustrating wide
range of views associated with MeDougal and Lasswell's approach).
46. This epistemological confidence in the fruits of scientific inquiry is a pervasive attribute of
McDougal and Lasswell's enterprise, briefly specified in the Preface. See I JURISPRUDENCE, supra note I,
at xxii-xxiii.
47. For an analysis of the complex transition to modernism, see generally STEPHEN ToULMIN,
COSMOPOLIS: THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF MODERNITY (1990).
48. See 2 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 725-41, 1017-31, 1131-54; see also McDOUGAL &
REISMAN, supra note 34; MYRES S. MCDOUGAL Er AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
(1980); LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-22 (1989).
49. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN at xi (1992). In fairness,
McDougal and Lasswell give an isolated acknowledgment that it is at least theoretically possible for a
socialist schema to be consistent with the values of human dignity, even if the empirical record fails to
posit a single supportive instance. In the course of the chapters attributed primarily to Lasswell, they
suggest that "[lt is speculatively conceivable that socialist economies in advanced industrial societies and
in big states can learn how to maintain high levels of economic progress by strategies other than
maintaining high levels of terror." 2 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 1147.
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it in favor of the West in a manner that has been abundantly validated but that
was by no means self-evident when initially articulated. 5' There is an element
of mea culpa involved here; I tended to regard the ideological struggle as far
less clear-cut while it was unfolding, seeing serious flaws in the value
commitments of both systems.5' As well, my fear that the Cold War would
generate a catastrophic World War III made me receptive to the project of
constructing a world order based on coexistence that transcended the
ideological divide while respecting a diversity of views within the antagonistic
blocs.5 2 In retrospect, given the oppressiveness and ineptitude of the Soviet
system, ruining everything and everyone it touched, I now regard the
ideological partisanship of McDougal and Lasswell as far preferable to my
posture of nonpartisan criticism and emphasis on war avoidance." This
clarity of commitment informs their jurisprudence at every stage, giving it both
a historical relevance and rootedness, and an ahistorical validation of great
significance-for the process of democratizing, realizing the values of a free
society, is without end. Admitting this, which I gladly do, is not, however, an
acquiescence in their claim that values and policy can be put on a scientific
foundation in the sense of objective knowledge generative of "correct" policy
choices. 54 There are two interrelated problems here. If scientific means
objective, then it cannot be achieved in policy domains. If scientific is more
adequately and contemporaneously understood as encompassing varying
degrees of chaos, uncertainty, irreducible complexity, and indeterminacy, then
McDougal and Lasswell's invocation of science is misleading-for science in
this sense does not generate determinate answers to policy problems."
50. See McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 17. at 1-6. Note especially their cnticisms of false
universalism of the sort posited in C. WILFRED JENKS. THE COMMoN LAW OF MANKIND (1958). McDougal
& Lasswell, supra note 17, at I n.l, 2.
51. See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, THE END OF WORLD ORDER 3-23. 35--69. 89-101 (1983); RICHARD
FALK, THE PROMISE OF WORLD ORDER 1-4 (1987).
52. See RICHARD A. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS 150-59 (1975); RICHARD A. FALK. T'Its
ENDANGERED PLANET 309-12 (1971). Although this anxiety has not been validated. it is a matter of
unresolved (and, likely, unresolvable) conjecture as to how great risks of general war were at vanous points
of crisis in the Cold War;, the "lessons" of the past are always overdrawn, as occurrences that might have
happened, or almost happened, are essentially neglected in favor of what did happen.
53. Arguably, the excesses of both positions were avoided by the encounter between them. producing
a desirable mutual muting that kept the focus on the stakes of struggle, but also on its nsks.
54. McDougal, while right on the fundamental split between public order systems. may still be
irresponsible with respect to the advocacy of given interventions in foreign societies: what would it mean
to be irresponsible? In his jurisprudential terms, it would mean not clarifying the bias of the observer.
failing to grasp the antecedent grounds of the conflict, inadequately assessing the prospects for success, or
refusing to think through the implications of alternative lines of policy. The best example is probably
McDougal's support for the U.S. role in the Vietnam War. See supra note 44. Beyond this, the complexity
of reality makes the resolution of choice opaque from the perspective of the rational. inquing mind:
otherwise, every split judicial decision would be an expression of mental incompetence or corrpuon.
55. The traditional image of scientific rationality is based on the discovery of "laws" that explain
causation in a manner that excludes indeterminacy. The more recent image, while acknowledging the
traditional emphasis on predictability, seeks to grasp the social and cognitive importance of degrees of
unpredictability arising from unfathomable patterns of complexity and causation. For useful introductory
accounts, see JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS (1987); STEPHEN H. KEILERT. IN THlE WAKE OF CHAOS (1993); i.
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The collaboration itself also introduced tensions into the jurisprudence.
Lasswell's garrison-state hypothesis was one of his most famous
conceptualizations: that world political trends were inducing a pervasive
militarization of the governing process everywhere, including in the countries
of the liberal West.56 An outgrowth of Lasswell's work prior to his
collaboration with McDougal, the garrison-state hypothesis is somewhat
unconvincingly incorporated into the jurisprudence late in the second volume.
This hypothesis is not easily reconciled with the ideological bipolarity of a
world order that pits totalitarian versus free societies as the essential struggle
of our time, a view that anchors the McDougal and Lasswell jurisprudence in
the history of the Cold War era. This tension is obliquely addressed deep in
the entrails of the McDougal and Lasswell opus, as one of two "constructs"
presenting contrasting "images of a terminal state of man."57 The other
construct, labeled "Construct B. Toward a Universal Public Order of Human
Dignity," is a scenario not present in Lasswell's earlier independent work that
envisions cumulative progress being achieved in relation to the eight public
order values.5" While informing readers that they did not "intend to obtrude
our estimates of the outcome into the presentation," McDougal and Lasswell
went on to say that "we are not sanguine," while regarding neither result as
"inevitable." 5
9
This fear of pervasive militarization was quite plausible given the
persistence of Cold War tensions that imposed a readiness in the nuclear age
to wage all-out strategic war at a moment's notice. Lasswell also believed that
the techniques of manipulation and coercion available to the modem state
would allow total control over territorial space, and that leaders, even in
democratic societies, were being driven toward a garrison-prison ethos. 60 Of
course, it is a great relief that this "construct" has not come to pass, although
it is also the case that Construct B has not materialized, despite the spread of
human rights and democratic values.
Two observations are relevant here. First, the garrison-state hypothesis is
more systemic than is the other view of a rivalry between contending public
MITCHELL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY: THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS (1992).
For Ilya Prigogine's seminal reimagining of science, see ILYA PRIGOGINE & ISABELLE STENGERS, ORDER
OUT OF CHAOS (1984). For a useful effort to adapt the understanding of international relations to these
perspectives, see JAMES N. ROSENAU, TURBULENCE IN WORLD POLMCs 47-66 (1990).
56. See Lasswell, World Revolution, supra note 24, at 73-77.
57. See 2 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 986. The garrison-state construct is labeled "Toward a
Garrison-Prison World." 2 id. at 986-1017. Note that the use of the word "man" in this formulation is very
anachronistic in relation to normative sensitivities of the 1990's. And this matter of semantic choice cannot
be reduced to an issue of "political correctness." There has occurred, despite the "Reagan revolution" and
now the "Contract with America," a societal shift in attitude toward gender that affects acceptable language
use at this time. I stress this point partly for substantive reasons, but also to reinforce the contention that
the jurisprudence as published has a dated quality attributable to its long period of gestation and refinement.
58. See 2 id. at 1017-31.
59. 2 id. at 986.
60. See 2 id. at 991-95.
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order systems, but has turned out to be a false alarm. There is not now evident
any trend toward an increase in state power vis-A-vis the citizenry. Second, the
stress on the coercive capabilities of the state fails to take into account the
impact of global market forces on the role and character of the state in the
evolving world order. McDougal and Lasswell fail, along with most other
work on global trends, to appreciate the vital restructuring impact of economic
globalization and regionalization on the nature of the state, including its
function in upholding territorial security.
McDougal and Lasswell are sensitive to the significance of power
(effective control) considerations in determining legal outcomes, perhaps overly
so.6 Every specialist in international law is confronted by the challenge of
irrelevance, namely, that foreign policy is inherently discretionary, that law is
either manipulated to rationalize policy or ignored by reference to national
interests, and that the failure to realize this has been detrimental to the
protection of national interests. 62 One can read the enormous jurisprudential
enterprise generated by the New Haven approach as a gigantic exercise of
reassurance, an insistence that if properly understood international law is
similar in its essence to other types of law and can guide decision by courts,
government officials, and advisers in a manner that is beneficial (in preserving
power and furthering values) both for those in authority and for members of
the broader community. As expressed by McDougal in the preface, "[t]he
jurisprudence for which we searched was one relevant, in its theories and
intellectual procedures, for any community, including the global or earth-space
community and all its component communities. A jurisprudence which stopped
short with a single nation-state could scarcely be adequate in or for an
interdependent world. 63
I would register two responses, while taking note of the grandiosity
implicit in their transcultural claim to provide a jurisprudence that will fit
equally well everywhere. Such an attempt has grown more difficult over time,
as formerly colonial nations seek economic, cultural, and social autonomy, in
61. McDougal and Lasswell express this sensitivity both by associating law in its essence with
effective control-that is, the capacity to translate claims of authority into behavior--and by classifying
power as the first of their eight values that together constitute the basis of human dignity and provide the
guidelines for the realization of a free democratic society. See I id. at 147-50. 399-404; 2 id. at 941-48;
see also Myres S. McDougal, Law and Power, 46 AM. J. INT'L L_ 102- 109-12 (1952).
62. For a classic statement of this claim, see GEORGE F. KENNAN. AMERICAN DIPLO.IACY 1900-1950.
at 95-100 (rev. ed. 1984). This challenge is often suppressed in more legalistic approaches to internauonal
law, but it is always lurking in the background, haunting the claim that governments should defer to
international law in the implementation of foreign policy. I have discussed this theme in several settings.
See RICHARD A. FALK, A GLOBAL APPROACH TO NA'nONAL PoLIcY 29-40 (1975); Richard A. Falk, Law,
Lawyers, and the Conduct of American Foreign Relations. 78 YALE L. 919 (1969). See generally Louis
HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 31-83 (1968); THE RELEVANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1968) Dean Acheson. The Arrogance
of International Lawyers, Remarks Before the Section of International and Comparative Law of the
American Bar Association (Mar. 24, 1968), in 2 INT'L LAW. 591 (1968).
63. 1 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note I. at xxii.
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addition to political independence. We are only now beginning to realize the
postcolonial assertiveness of non-Western societies, as well as the radical
unevenness of perception and memory across space and through time that
renders suspect all universalist thinking originating in the West.64 First of all,
the McDougal and Lasswell attempt to provide a universal jurisprudence is the
most impressive effort ever made to achieve this result, although its impact
outside of international law has been decidedly modest, and this despite
Lasswell's eminence as a social scientist.65  Second, the jurisprudence's
universalist claims are irrelevant to its real achievements as a tool and
framework for analysis, and are oblivious to the most serious shortcomings of
its orientation for the purpose of assessing and enhancing policy choice with
respect to the domain of international law.
66
By seeking to establish the political credentials of international law as
helpful to governments dedicated to the promotion of human dignity, a goal
that in practical application has meant defending the contested international
initiatives of the U.S. government, 67 the McDougal and Lasswell approach
has often been accused of conflating law with apology for state power.68
Perhaps worse is their appeal to existing authority structures and power-
wielders as if they were receptive to the promotion of the values of human
dignity, ignoring the distorting effects of structures of exploitation, privilege,
64. One dimension of this assertiveness is the rise of inter-civilizational tensions, especially between
Islam and the West. In this regard, see Samuel R Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF.,
Summer 1993, at 22; see also OLIVIER ROY, THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM (1994); Thomas Kamm,
Rise of Islam in France Rattles the Populace and Stirs a Backlash, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5. 1995, at Al, A6.
On the less lethal challenge to Western-guided universalism, see Yoichi Funabashi, The Asianization of
Asia, FOREIGN AF., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 75; Fareed Zakaria, Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee
Kuan Yew, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 109. The McDougal and Lasswell approach to cultural
identity is, in contrast to that of the writers cited, to stress the potential for harmonization, provided only
that public order systems are liberal democratic in character. See, e.g., 2 JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at
787-803.
65. On the jurisprudence's modest impact outside of international law, see Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal
Studies in Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 85-88 (1991). On Lasswell's eminence as
a social scientist, see MeDougal's prefatory note "McDougal On Lasswell," and the references cited there.
I JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at xxix-xxxvii.
66. Rosalyn Higgins' adaptation is suggestive of one line ofjurisprudential evolution that derives from
the New Haven approach. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS (1994). Her formulation at the
end of this fine book imparts its quasi-McDougalian orientation:
International law is a process, a system of authoritative decision-making. It is not just the
neutral application of rules.... The problem exactly is that various, quite plausible, alternative
prescriptions can be and have been argued for. The role of international law is to assist in
choice between these various alternatives.... International law is a process for resolving
problems. And it is a great and exciting adventure.
Id. at 267. At the same time, her substantive discussions are fairly conventional doctrinal expositions
without any particular elaboration of the global setting or the policymaking framework.
67. This convergence is evident in the setting of policy application, perhaps most pronouncedly in
relation to interventionary diplomacy during the Cold War era, but also on such matters as nuclear weapons
tests on the high seas and the interpretation of the U.N. Charter to minimize the role of the Soviet veto.
See sources cited supra note 44.
68. For critical analysis, see MAgrT KOSKENIEI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 173-78 (1989); Purvis,
supra note 65, at 83-87; see also Philip Trimble, International Law, World Order and Critical Legal
Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 815-20 (1990).
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and unevenness-although the policymakers and decision-making elites are
beneficiaries of such structures, and are generally unaware of such disguised
biases. The invocation of human dignity as the foundational criterion of
legality covers up the failure to engage in social criticism of a more concrete
variety, that brings into view factors of race, class, and gender. Somehow, the
workings of the legal system are never tested by critical reflection upon
ongoing struggles against a variety of oppressive circumstances and on behalf
of those most vulnerable. The McDougal and Lasswell enterprise, for all its
vastness, devotes no space to the cartography of suffering and victimization
that occurs within the sort of public order system, based on the principles of
liberal democracy, of which they approve.
IV. SUMMING UP
There is no doubt in my mind that immersion in the McDougal and
Lasswell jurisprudence is beneficial from many standpoints: student, scholar,
policymaker, and judge. It softens predispositional bias and fills in many of the
gaps found in conventional wisdom. As such, it provides an invaluable
pedagogic tool that has proven useful, even formative, for several generations
of students who have attended the Yale Law School, and then moved on to a
variety of careers.
Further, it is a prodigious intellectual achievement. The sheer magnitude
of the scholarly endeavor is quite overwhelming. Only a seasoned weightlifter
could carry the McDougal and Lasswell corpus. More deeply, the integrity of
seeing the world clearly from a single vantage point provides a kind of moral
certification of lifelong dedication to the pursuit of "truth." Their sustained
commitment, especially given the subject matter, stands in contrast to academic
work that follows trends or headlines and adds up to nothing in the end.
Whatever else, McDougal and Lasswell have established a clearly contoured
presence in writings about law, especially international law.
Will the McDougal and Lasswell orientation provide the basis for future
endeavors to construct a jurisprudence for free societies? I think here its role
will be restricted. Their enterprise too fully embodies the modernist legacy of
the Enlightenment, with its particular turn toward universal science and reason,
a meta-narrative of society and humanity that implicitly and operationally
situates the West at the center.69 In this regard, the absence of critical
69. For varying strands of this postmodern critique of rationality and the ordered woridview of
modernity, see DAvID HARvEY, THE CONDMON OF POSTMODERNrrY: AN ENQUIRY INTrO THE ORIGINS OF
CULTURAL CHANGE 10-38 (1989); JEAN-FRANOIS LYOTARD. THE POSTNIODERN CO NDoN at xxiii-xxv
(1984); JOHN McGOWAN, POSTMODERNISM AND ITS CRmcs 14-16. 19-21 (1991); see also TOULItN.
supra note 47, at 192-98, 206-09 (arguing new phase of modernity will witness shift in importance from
nation-state to sub-, trans-, and multinational levels); RLBJ. WALKER, ONE WORLD/MANY WORLDS 57-63
(1988) (postmodern approach to world order, arguing "critical social movements" must emerge to establish
connections across time and space); CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE at xvi-xviii (1980)
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perspectives reflecting the interests of excluded constituencies (women, non-
Westerners, the poor, indigenous peoples) is a fatal flaw. A free society is
most likely to emerge from the interplay of difference and sameness, a
dialectic of sorts.70 McDougal and Lasswell, despite their fabled openness to
a diversity of perspectives and participants, cannot accommodate such radical
questionings of the established order. Also, they do not help us achieve an
identity as political actors or citizens based on the possibilities of the future
(community, time), rather than the necessities of the present (territory,
space). 7 A jurisprudence of human dignity would have to include the training
needed to reconceptualize citizenship, moving it by stages to encompass an
imagined future (that is, a time dimension) as well as to infuse traditional
territorial affiliations of citizenship (that is, a space dimension) with world
order values.72
(feminist and ecological critique of mythos and practice of rationalist science).
70. For a challenging formulation of difference as constitutive, see TRINH T. MINH-IA, WOMAN,
NATIVE, OTHER: WRITING POSTCOLONIALITY AND FEMINISM (1989).
71. For some discussion along these lines, see generally RICHARD FALK, EXPLORATIONS AT THE EDOE
OF TIME: THE PROSPECTS FOR WORLD ORDER (1992).
72. I have elaborated on this assertion in two recent published discussions. See Richard Falk.
Democratizing, Internationalizing, and Globalizing, in GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION 475-502 (Yoshikazu
Sakamoto ed., 1994); Richard Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, in THE CONDITION OF CmTZENSIIIP
127, 139-40 (Bart van Steenbergen ed., 1994). Also relevant are various claims that to counter the
detrimental impacts of global market forces it is necessary to protect territorial or social interests by
adopting new tactics and strategies. Robert Reich has written in this vein, encouraging what he calls
"positive economic nationalism" as a constructive reaction to the gravitational pulls of economic globalism.
See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 301-15 (1991).
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